主讲人：李建培教授（对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院）  

主持人：张岸洲助理教授（威尼斯集团网站官网李安民经济研究院）  

嘉宾介绍：马湘君教授（威尼斯集团网站官网经济学部）  

时间：2022年10月28日（周五）  14：00-15：30（北京时间）  

地点：腾讯会议：907 4908 3431  

语言：中文  

摘要：The literature shows paradoxically that the widely-used practice of behavior-based pricing (BBP) is typically inferior to uniform pricing for a monopoly seller. We analyze the profitability of BBP in a setting where the monopoly seller holds private information about the quality of his product and interacts with the consumers in two periods. Relative to uniform pricing, BBP increases the consumers' sensitivity to a first-period price change and leads to a larger demand reduction when low-quality seller imitates the price choice of high-quality seller. Consequently, BBP lowers the price the high-quality seller needs to set to separate himself from a low-quality seller, decreases the signaling cost of high-quality product, and becomes a potentially profitable strategy both when the seller can and cannot commit to future prices. Moreover, the benefits to the seller do not come at the expense of the consumers because the average price is lower with BBP and consumer surplus also increases. In the separating equilibria that survive the intuitive criterion, the price pattern of high-quality product when BBP is allowed exhibits first-purchase discount that is widely observed in practice.  

主讲人简介：李建培，对外经济贸易大学经济学教授、博士生导师。主要从事产业组织理论和契约理论研究，研究题目包括团队生产中的锦标赛机制、最优采购契约的设计、专家市场侵权责任设计、差别定价的福利影响等。多篇论文发表于经济学国际顶尖期刊，包括RAND Journal of Economics (3篇), Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economics（2篇），International Economic Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization，Social Choice and Welfare等。先后主持国家社科基金重点项目、国家社科基金重大项目子课题、国家自然科学基金青年项目、霍英东教育基金会基础性研究项目，曾入选教育部新世纪优秀人才计划，并荣获2018年中国信息经济学乌家培奖。